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CASE NOTE: ZONING-RIPARIAN RIGHTS-
IMPROVED LANDS UNDER NAVIGABLE WA-
TERS SUBJECT TO LOCAL ORDINANCES.
HARBOR ISLAND MARINA v. BOARD OF COM-
MISSIONERS, 286 Md. 303, 407 A.2d 738 (1979)
by Harold Norton
Baltimore City and most of Maryland's sixteen water-
front counties have enacted ordinances that in some way
regulate the exercise of the common law right of a ripar-
ian property owner to "wharf out".' These ordinances
are the tools that enable local decision makers to promote
"the health, safety, morals (and) ... general welfare
' 2
along the 3,190 miles of shoreline bordering 2,429
square miles of navigable water in this state.3 By restrict-
ing the number, size and use of structures built onto
'E.g., ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY CODE §§ 13-321 et seq. (1969); CALVERT
COUNTY ZONING (1979); CHARLES COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCES art. III(a)(13)(1),
art. IV(a)(1), art. V(a)(15)(1) (1974); DORCHESTER COUNTY ZONING ORDI-
NANCES§ 6.01,57 (1977); KENT COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCES art. 4 § § 7(2)(a)
thru 8; art. 5 §§ 7.1 et seq. (1975); QUEEN ANNES COUNTY ZONING ORDI-
NANCES § 2.10, § 17.13 (1974); SOMERSET COUNTY ORDINANCES § 5(7)
(1976); TALBOT COUNTY CODE § 19-8(g) (1977); cf., BALTIMORE COUNTY
BUILDING CODE §§ 5-8 (1978). At Common Law the right to construct a
wharf to obtain access for navigation and travel was recognized as
incident to the ownership of the riparian upland. Railroad Co. v.
Schurmeir, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 272, 289 (1868); Balto. & O.R.R. Co. v.
Chase, 43 Md. 23, 35-36 (1875). This practice is now permitted by
statute in most states. See 1 R. Clark, Waters and Water Rights § 43
(1967) [hereinafter 1 R. Clark]; MD. NAT RES CODEANN § 9-201 (1979
Cum. Supp.)
2 These virtues, to which all zoning ordinances must purportedly aspire,
are espoused in the grant of zoning power to the various political
subdivisions by MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.01 (non-charter coun-
ties); art. 25A, § 5(X) (1979 Cum. Supp.) (charter counties) and art.
66B, § 2.01 (1978) (Baltimore City).
'Md. Dept. of Gen. Services, Maryland Manual 1979-80, 1 (1979).
submerged land, a county may assure structural confor-
mity with the general characteristics of the surrounding
zone. 4
The aforegoing revelation hardly seems earthshaking
when one considers the disruptive effect even a small
commercial marina might have on a residentially-zoned
neighborhood.' Prohibition of unrestricted development
onto underwater lands properly avoids permitting "a pig
in the parlor instead of in the barnyard." 6
Justification of these restrictive means requires more
than merely pointing to the good result, however, when
one considers that: no statute explicitly authorizes the
zoning of underwater lands;7 the lands beneath our navi-
gable waters do not belong to riparian owners or the
counties, but to the state; 8 and that without such explicit
authorization state owned land is not subject to local
zoning restrictions. ' Despite these apparent limitations,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Harbor Island Mar-
ina v. Board of Commissioners, 286 Md. 303, 407 A.2d
738 (1979), re-examined the state's long, unique historic-
al treatment of riparian rights in order to ratify this exer-
cise of local authority. While recognizing that all lands
beneath navigable waters originally belong to the state,
the court held that once a riparian property owner exer-
cises his right to improve underwater lands bordering his
property, his rights in those lands become "tantamount to
complete ownership", 0 and, like other property rights,
may be subject to local zoning laws.11
The dispute in Harbor Island centers on the authority
of the Calvert County Commissioners to restrict develop-
ment on lands beneath Solomons Harbor.1 2 The trial
court, through a declaratory judgment, characterized the
restrictions as valid regulation of riparian rights under
Article 66B of the Maryland Annotated Code. The Court
of Special Appeals reversed, indicating that the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter before the
marina had exhausted its administrative appeal. 13 The
4 See e.g., the ordinances cited in note 1, supra.
'See e.g., Taxpayers' Ass'n. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 301 N.Y. 215,93
N.E.2d 645 (1950). (Variance improperly granted where proposed
marina would alter character of existing residential neighborhood); c.f.,
Long Island Court Homeowners' Ass'n. v. Methner, 74 Mich. App.
383, 254 N.W.2d 57 (1977) (expansion of existing marina in residen-
tial district enjoined as a nuisance).
6 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
'The zoning powers granted to political subdivisions by the legislature
refer only to "land" or "lands". See statutes cited in note 2 supra.
8MD. DECL RTS. art. 5; Caine v. Cantrell, 279 Md. 392, 396; 369 A.2d
56, 58 (1977). See, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. i, 14-21 (1894);
Notes 19 and 25, infra.
City of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217. 378 A.2d 1326 (1977).
"Harbor Island, 286 Md. at 320, 407 A.2d at 747.
"Id., 286 Md. at 322, 407 A.2d at 748.
12CALVERT COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCES, art. 15 (1976).
"Harbor Island Marina, Inc. v. Bd. County Comm'rs, Md. App. (filed
Dec. 14, 1978); see Maryland - National Capital Park & Planning
Commission v. Washington National Arena. 282 Md. 588, 594-595,
386 A.2d 1216, 1222 (1978).
Court of Appeals ruled that a declaratory judgment was
available to challenge the "power or authority" of the
commissioners by "direct [constitutional] attack" and
took the case to decide that challenge.' 4
Because the rights in navigable waters often vary from
state to state it is difficult to generalize the effect that
zoning laws may have on the lands beneath them.
15
Courts that have considered whether tidal lands may be
subject to local zoning have focused on the nature of
ownership rights in both underwater land and the adja-
cent riparian upland.
Absent pre-emptive statutory restrictions, a political
subdivision may regulate the use of privately owned
underwater lands within its borders.16 A contrary rule
would impair the legitimate purposes of zoning restric-
tions at the water's edge. Consider the paradigm com-
mercial marina erected adjacent to a residential neighbor-
hood. Such unrestricted offshore development would
substantially alter the character and uniformity sought in
the immediate upland zone. The exemption of private
underwater lands has concerned other courts7 and was
rejected in Harbor Island:
The purpose of the zoning law is to promote health,
safety, and general welfare of the public... "The very
essence of zoning is territorial division according to the
character of the land and ... their peculiar suitability
for particular uses, and uniformity of use within the
zone" . . . Thus, to limit the power to zone to only the
dry land within a county places an unwarranted restric-
tion on the exercise of the police power.... (citations
omitted)
For the most part, ownership in the soil under navi-
gable waters is in the states for the benefit of their
citizens.19 At the same time, the power of a political subdi-
14 286 Md. at 309, 407 A.2d at 741.
16 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894); See generally, Id. at 14-21;
1 R. Clark, supra, § 40.2 at 248-49. Rights in navigable waters may
also depend on more local matters. See, e.g., Town of Islip v. Powell,
78 Misc.2d 1007, 358 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1974). (Nassau and Suffolk
counties immune from state navigation law); c.f., MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN ch. 91 § 35 (1974) and N.H. REv STATS ANN. ch. 271 § 20
(1977 Cum. Supp.) (public ownership in ponds larger than 10 acres).
162 Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 9.13 at 114 (2d ed. 1976);
See Penning v. Owens, 340 Mich. 355, 65 N.W.2d 831 (1954); c.f.,
A.L.I. A Model Land Development Code § 1-201 (6) (April 1974
Draft) ("land includes the earth, water and air, above below or on the
surface").
17 Brady v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 348 Mass. 515, 204 N.E.2d
513 (1965) (nonconforming use could not be enlarged by extending
pier on privately owned land); Wynn v. Margate City, 9 N.J. Misc.
1324, 157 A. 565 (1931) (privately owned underwater land subject to
building restrictions); Town of Islip v. Powell, 78 Misc.2d 1007, 358
N.Y.S.2d 985 (1974) (underwater lands exempt from state control
may be subject to zoning).
18 286 Md. at 312, 407 A.2d at 743.
191 R. Clark, supra, § 36.4(A); See generally, Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 14-21 (1894). This ownership is subject only to the right of the
vision to restrict land use through zoning is granted by the
state and unless the enabling legislation indicates other-
wise, it is presumed that state owned land will not be
subject to zoning restrictions.2" Focusing only on the res-
triction of the underwater land itself, it becomes apparent
that local restrictions on lands under navigable waters
must be subject to the paramount authority of the land-
owning state.2
By emphasizing the power of local authorities to restrict
the use of land within its boundaries, including all of the
rights that attach to that land, some courts have ignored
the issue of "sovereign immunity" from zoning law. The
decisions stress the right of access to navigable waters
bounding property that riparian or littoral owners possess
federal government to regulate navigation. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824); see Philadelphia Company v. Stimson, 223
U.S. 605, 634-636 (1912).
2°Eg., Aviation Services, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 20 N.J. 275, 282,
119 A.2d 761, 765 (1956); City of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217,
378 A.2d 1326 (1977); cf., St. Louis County v. City of Manchester,
360 S.W.2d 638 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1962) (scope of city's authority is a
significant factor to be considered where immunity from county zon-
ing is sought).
"1Erbs/and v. Vercchiola, 35 App. Div. 564, 313 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1969),
aff'd after remand sub nom, Erbsland v. Rubin, 33 N.Y.2d 787, 350
N.Y.S.2d 653, 305 N.E.2d 775 (1970).
FORUM
as an interest incident to the upland.2 In this light, the
building of an improvement is seen as an extension of the
land that it serves and, like the exercise of other property
rights, may be subject to valid zoning restrictions. Under
this analysis, valid zoning restrictions cannot be defeated
by the exercise of a right that, but for the upland property
ownership, would have no independent existence.
The Court of Appeals in Harbor Island used a two part
analysis in deciding that Calvert County was empowered
to zone lands used for improvements into navigable wa-
ters. The first involved the construction of section 4.01 of
Article 66B of the Maryland Annotated Code, which au-
thorizes the zoning of "land or lands." 2 3 The Court noted
that in view of the broad powers generally given to the
county by the statute, a restriction of its meaning to
encompass only dry land would be unwarranted and, like
other courts, it recognized that "the reasons for zoning do
not terminate at the shoreline ... 24 This construction
alone, was not found sufficient to uphold the county's
power to zone lands under navigable waters in view of
their ownership by the state.2 ' Accordingly, the second
part of the Court's analysis focused on the nature of the
statutory right of Maryland riparian property owners to
"wharf out."
In order to encourage commercial development of the
port of Baltimore during Maryland's growth as a propri-
tary colony, Cecil Calvert, Lord Proprietor, in the Acts of
1745, provided that "[a]ll improvements" made into the
water by riparian owners became the property of that
upland owner 6.2 A similar provision was enacted in 1862
22 "To the extent that by zoning regulations a municipality may limit the
uses to be made of property generally, it may also by zoning regula-
tions limit the exercise of riparian rights." Poneleit v. Dudas, 141
Conn. 413, 106 A.2d 479, 481 (1954); accord Brady v. Board of
Appeals of Westport, 384 Mass. 515, 204 N.E.2d 513, 519 (1965);
Wynn v. Margate City, 9 N.J. Misc. 1324, 157 A. 565, 566-67 (1931).
21 The sole reference concerning the territorial reach of the county's
power may be found in the language which grants the authority "to
regulate and restrict the ... use of buildings, signs, structures and
land" and the power "upon the zoning use of any land or lands... [to]
impose such additional restrictions ... as may be deemed appropriate
to preserve ... the general character and design of the lands and
improvements being zoned ... or of the surrounding or adjacent
lands and improvements" MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.01(a) -
4.01(b); 286 Md. at 312, 407 A.2d at 743.
24 286 Md. at 319, 407 A.2d at 747.
25 Upon the birth of Maryland as a proprietary colony, lands under
navigable waters were granted to Caecillius Calvert, Lord of Balti-
more, as Lord Proprietor by King Charles I. Under Article V of the
Constitution of Maryland, title to these lands vested in the state as a
public trustee for the benefit of its citizens. Kerpelman v. Board of
Public Works, 261 Md. 436, 445, 276 A.2d 57, 61, cert. denied, 404
U.S. 858 (1971). State owned lands are not subject to local zoning
law. City of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217, 378 A.2d 1326 (1977);
accord, Erbsland v. Vecchiolla, 313 N.Y.S.2d 548, 35 App. Div. 564,
aff'd after remand sub nom Erbsland v. Rubin, 33 N.Y.2d 787, 350
N.Y.S.2d 653, 305 N.E.2d 775 (1970) (state-owned lands under
navigable waters).
25 1745 Laws of Maryland ch. 9.
to apply to the navigable waters of the entire state 7 and in
1973 was recodified in Section 9-201(a) of the National
Resources Code: (a) A person who is the owner of land
bounding on navigable water ... may make improve-
ments into the water in front of the land to preserve that
person's access to the navigable water or protect the
shore of that person against erosion. After an improve-
ment has been constructed, it is the property of the owner
of the land to which it is attached ....
Rather than focus on its previous recognition that ripar-
ian rights are "subject to general rules and regulations
(properly) imposed by public authorities, ' 28 the court
went on to construe Section 9-201(a) as it had its prede-
cessors.
Reverting to a consideraion of the present case, what
we have before us is a policy decision which has existed
for over two centuries-when improvements are made
into the navigable waters by a riparian proprietor, the
land utilized in their construction, which prior to comple-
tion belonged to the State, for all practical purposes be-
comes a part of his fast land. Thus, any limitation upon
the county's ability to zone which arises because the land
in question belongs to the State does not apply to im-
provements attached to riparian land.25
Therefore, the "lands" that may be subject to valid
local zoning ordinances include those utilized in con-
structing improvements onto navigable waters. The statu-
tory right to wharf out, "when exercised, is nothing more
than extension of the shore land.
2 3
The result reached by the court in Harbor Island is
consistent with the basic purposes of local zoning and
land use control in allowing a political subdivision to
regulate riparian activity that is intimately associated with
the properly zoned upland. By construing section 9-
201(a) as providing a statutory grant of the land utilized
by the riparian owner in erecting an improvement, the
court concluded that state lands are not affected by local
restrictions on such improvements. While other avenues
of analysis may lead to the same result, 31 the decision is a
necessary and reasonable interpretation of the general
zoning authority granted to Maryland's political subdivi-
sions.
2 1862 Laws of Maryland ch. 129.
2
1Causey v. Gray, 250 Md. 380, 387, 243 A.2d 575, 581 (1968).
29 286 Md. at 322, 407 A.2d at 748.
30 286 Md. at 323, 407 A.2d at 749.
31 Zoning restrictions on riparian improvements may be characterized as
merely restricting the use of the upland property, see note 22 supra,
and involving only private property. Argument may also be made that
what the counties are attempting to control is not the state's use of the
land but rather use by private upland owners. In this context, the issue
of immunity from local zoning law does not arise. See, Youngstown
Cartage Co. v. North Point Peninsula Community Coordinating
Council, 24 Md. App. 624, 627-28, 332 A.2d 718, 719-20, cert.
granted 275 Md. 758 (1975), appeal dismissed Aug. 1, 1975 (non-
compliance with Md. Rule 830).
